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\No other business so starkly and extremely denes the meaning of risk and reward -
and the profound impact of chance and fate." Yergin (2008)
1 Introduction
Natural resource extraction inuences a myriad of economic factors ranging from political
economy to scal and monetary policy. However, no clear consensus has emerged on
whether economies which discover natural resources should anticipate prosperous times or
fear the much discussed Dutch Disease. Disentangling the various channels through which
natural resources aect the economy has proven challenging. Even the pure market eect
of natural resource extraction is not well understood. Natural resource extraction might
crowd out other sectors of the economy by driving up local prices, or on the other hand
could have positive spillovers which lead to the concentration of economic activity.
This paper uses the quasi-experiment generated by the random outcomes of exploratory
oil drilling in Brazil in order to investigate the causal eect of natural resource discoveries
on local development.1 Specically, we compare economic outcomes in municipalities where
the national oil company Petrobras drilled for oil but did not nd any, to outcomes in those
municipalities in which it drilled for oil and was successful.2 Drilling attempts were carried
out in many locations with similar geological characteristics, but oil was found in only a few
places. The \treatment assignment" is related to the success of drilling attempts: places
where oil was found were assigned to treatment, while places with no oil are part of the
control group. The treatment assignment resembles a \randomization" since (conditional
on drilling taking place) a discovery depends mainly on luck. Therefore, places with oil
discoveries are the \winners" of the \geological lottery". Since there were no signicant
royalty payments to municipalities in Brazil until several decades after the rst discoveries,
we are able to isolate the direct impact of oil extraction from the eect of scal windfalls.
Our analysis uses a novel dataset on the drilling of approximately 20,000 oil wells in
Brazil from 1940-2000. The dataset covers the complete universe of wells drilled since
exploration began in the country and provides information on three stages regarding oil
extraction and production: drilling, discovery, and upstream production. We use this
detailed information on the data generating process to distinguish those municipalities
which were assigned to treatment from those which constitute the control group. Our focus
1Oil and gas are also called petroleum or hydrocarbons. Throughout this paper we use \oil" to refer to
\oil and gas". The oil industry is loosely divided into two segments: upstream and downstream. Upstream
refers to exploration and production of oil while downstream refers to processing and transportation
(reneries, terminals etc).
2There are three administrative levels in Brazil: federal government, states, and municipalities. Mu-
nicipalities are autonomous entities that are able, for instance, to set property and service taxes. They are
roughly equivalent to counties in the US. We use the words municipalities, local governments and local
economies interchangeably.
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is on an Intent-to-Treat (ITT) analysis where we regress our outcome variables of interest
directly on discoveries. Discoveries take place in dierent locations over time, so we can
exploit time and cross-sectional variations. The ITT analysis enables us to obtain a lower
bound for the average treatment eect. We also estimate a Local Average Treatment Eect
(LATE) by instrumenting for production with discoveries.3 Besides, we study treatment
intensity using detailed information on dierent types of wells. This allows us to retrieve
a coecient that can be interpreted as a weighted-average of per-unit treatment eect.
The baseline results show that locations which discover oil have a 24.6-25.9% higher per
capita GDP over a span of up to 60 years compared to the control group. Furthermore, we
document an increase in both manufacturing and services GDP per capita but no impact
on agricultural GDP. While the measure of manufacturing GDP includes natural resource
extraction (and as such an increase is not surprising), the increase in services indicates
spillover eects of oil production impacting the rest of the economy.4 Additionally, we nd
evidence for an increase in urbanization of about 4% points. This increase in urbanization
is consistent with the increase in services we document. We do not nd any eect on
population density. Using historical data on sectoral employment we calculate a measure
of sectoral labor productivity and show that oil discoveries increase GDP mainly by in-
creasing productivity and not by increasing employment. We also show that while both
onshore and oshore discoveries increase manufacturing GDP (potentially in a mechanical
way since it includes oil production), only onshore discoveries increase services GDP and
urbanization. We hypothesize that demand from well paid oil workers are responsible for
the observed increase in services and urbanization. Oil municipalities become local service
and commerce hubs which benet from improved labor productivity.5 The treatment in-
tensity analysis suggests that major discoveries have a disproportionately large impact on
the local economy.
The fact that we do not nd a positive impact on population and employment density
on average might be due to the concentration of the oil industry in Brazil: the U.S. has a
more widespread ownership of resources than Brazil. There are thousands of oil companies
in the U.S. in contrast to the historical monopoly of Petrobras in Brazil. Due to this
market structure oil services are more likely to be concentrated in just a few places in
Brazil. By contrast, in the U.S. an entire chain of small oil services can be located close
to the more widespread oil rms.
3Endogeneity of production might be more of a problem for gas than for oil. While it is relatively easy
to transport oil, gas requires a substantial investment in infrastructure such as pipelines.
4Oil discoveries and production might have a positive or negative impact on non-oil manufacturing.
Given the data constraints we cannot investigate this, unfortunately.
5A recent report from the McKinsey (2013) Global Institute highlights the importance of oil and gas
exploration and production on economic development by supporting local employment and supply chains.
It argues that in many countries revenues spent on local goods and services often exceed tax and royalty
payments.
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Our results are robust to a variety of control groups, dierent control variables, and
a restriction of the sample period to 1940-1996. The latter is important since from 1997
onwards royalty payments became an important part of municipal income. By restricting
the analysis to the period prior to 1997 we verify whether our results are driven by di-
rect market eects or operate indirectly via government windfalls. Lastly, we show that
municipalities with oil discoveries have a higher probability of hosting major downstream
oil facilities than the control group. To check whether our results are driven by these
downstream facilities we re-run the regressions excluding those municipalities which host
them and nd that this is not the case. It appears that upstream production does not only
impact the local economy via downstream production but has also a direct eect.
Since the Oil and Gas industry is at the center of the production network in many
countries, its impact on the economy has been studied extensively in the literature. The
usual approach to disentangle the eects of oil production relies on cross-country evidence.
Several papers in the literature have shown correlations between natural resources and ad-
verse outcomes. For instance, Sachs and Warner (1995) show that resource-exporting coun-
tries tend to have lower growth rates, while Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby (2005)
point out that resource-exporting countries have poorer governance indicators. However,
cross-country evidence is sensitive to changing periods, sample sizes, and covariates (see
van der Ploeg (2011) for an overview of the literature)6. Additionally, cross-country stud-
ies usually use very aggregate variables and make it dicult to control for institutional
and cultural frameworks, and for policy variation between dierent countries.
As a result, the literature has been shifting attention to a more detailed analysis to
pin down specic mechanisms of how natural resources impact the economy. The main
empirical challenge, however, is to deal with the issue of endogeneity of natural resource
extraction since there are many unobservable variables that might be correlated with oil
production and might also aect economic development. Notable papers in an emer-
gent literature which tries to address these problems more directly are, among others,
Allcott and Keniston (2013), Caselli and Michaels (2013), Monteiro and Ferraz (2012), and
Michaels (2011)7. While Allcott and Keniston (2013) and Michaels (2011) focus on the
US we study a developing country8. More importantly, while the above papers are close
6There is also a large theoretical literature which tries to explain how natural resource abundance might
aect economic outcomes, such as theories based on the Dutch Disease hypothesis (e.g., Corden and Neary
(1982) and Krugman (1987)) or rent-seeking theories (e.g., Lane and Tornell (1996) and Caselli and Tesei
(2011)).
7Also see Acemoglu, Finkelstein, and Notowidigdo (2009) and Dube and Vargas (2013).
8Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Monteiro and Ferraz (2012) also investigate the impact of oil using
data from Brazilian municipalities. Our paper diers from theirs not only methodologically but also
regarding the question and the time span. Caselli and Michaels (2013) focus on the eects of oil windfalls
(Royalties) on government behavior and the provision of public goods, while Monteiro and Ferraz (2012)
also use Royalties to study local political and economic outcomes. We study the direct eects of oil
discoveries instead of the indirect eect via royalties.
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in spirit to our exercise we are, to our knowledge, the rst to identify the impact of
oil using the entire track of oil discoveries, since the existing literature mainly limits
attention to post-discovery periods. This paper is the rst to estimate the impact of
oil discoveries on local economic development using a (quasi-experimental) dierence-in-
dierence design. In terms of design and results our paper is also related to the litera-
ture on agglomeration externalities, especially the branch which investigates the impact
of interventions on the concentration of economic activity (Davis and Weinstein (2002),
Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010)). Similarly to our research, these papers are
motivated by the insights about the importance of within-country dierences in out-
put and wages (see Acemoglu and Dell (2010) and Moretti (2011)). Lastly, our focus
on sectoral GDP links the paper to studies on the determinants of structural transfor-
mation, particularly the ones focusing on the role of the oil sector (Stefanski (2010),
Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath (2013)).
While our results are derived for a specic institutional framework we believe that
some general lessons can be drawn from our empirical exercises. Specically, being able to
address issues of endogeneity and unobservable variables allows us to make causal state-
ments. Our results are consistent with the view that oil abundance is not necessarily a
curse at the local level. It is important to stress, however, that we cannot comment on
the aggregate impact of oil discoveries on the country as a whole. Compared to national
economies, municipalities are much more open and face macroeconomic policies which are
invariant to their idiosyncratic conditions. By construction our research design rules out
any eect which operates through the nominal exchange rate, for example.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the background on oil drilling and
on the key institutional aspects of oil exploration and production in Brazil. Section 3
details the research design used to identify the impact of oil on economic development.
In this paper we combine several datasets which are detailed in a subsection of Section
3. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy. Section 5 shows the results and robustness
exercises. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Oil Drilling
Oil and Gas exploration is a risky business. Oil companies aim to nd an oil eld, which
corresponds to a contiguous geographic area with oil. Oil companies search for areas with
specic geological characteristics to drill for oil. For instance, oil companies search for areas
that contain geological structures (subsurface contortions and specic rocks) for potential
trapping of hydrocarbons. Based on geological, geophysical, and geochemical information,
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an oil company selects an area to drill for oil. Geology and related disciplines provide
guidance on where to search for oil traps and estimating the probability of discovery prior
to drilling is an important aspect of petroleum exploration. However, only by drilling can
the company be certain that hydrocarbon deposits really exist. In other words, the only
direct way of conrming the hypothesis of oil presence is by drilling a well. Even with
modern technology, it is only by drilling that the existence of oil can be conrmed. Oil
companies may invest substantially in acquiring information to end-up with no discoveries
or no protable discoveries.
When an oil company drills a hole, the wells are classied according to the results of
the attempt. A drilled well can be classied, among other categories, as a discovery well,
a producer well, a dry hole, or an abandoned well (e.g., because of an accident). The
likelihood of nding oil from drilling can be low even in areas with appropriate geological
characteristics and learning-by-doing is an important aspect in the petroleum industry
(Kellogg (2011)). Testing by drilling is expensive and may not reduce the uncertainty
regarding the existence of oil. Numbers vary but in a newly explored area the likelihood of
drilling for oil successfully can be very low and subjective probabilities are widely accepted
in the petroleum industry (Harbaugh, Davis, and Wendebourg (1995)). Today, an explo-
ration well (wildcat well9) can have a probability as low as 10% of nding viable oil, while
a rank wildcat10 has an even smaller chance of nding oil. Therefore, even with modern
technology, drilling is not a \safe bet" since there is no guarantee that a company will nd
oil after drilling. Given the features of drilling, oil discovery depends both on geological
characteristics and on \luck"11. Our data support the idea that discovering oil is sort of
a \lottery": for every exploration well drilled which was successful there were many more
unsuccessful ones.
A myriad of factors inuence drilling success such as past drilling history, regional
endowment, resource depletion, onshore or oshore drilling, and technological progress.
While not immediately relevant for our research design it is worth pointing out that two of
those factors changed during our period of analysis: the level of technology available and
the availability of conspicuous targets of hydrocarbon deposits. A more detailed discussion
of oil drilling is given in Appendix B.
2.2 Oil in Brazil
Our period of analysis is from 1940 to 2000. Under most of this period, only government-
owned entities were able to explore and produce oil in Brazil. In 1938, under a dictatorship
9A well drilled a mile or more from an area of existing oil production.
10A well drilled in an area where there is no existing production.
11According to Harbaugh, Davis, and Wendebourg (1995), \luck is obviously a major factor in explo-
ration".
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period (1937-1945), Federal Law n. 395/38 established the state control of oil development
and only by 1997 (Federal Law n. 9,478/97) private companies would be allowed to au-
tonomously explore and produce oil in Brazil. Federal Law n. 395/38 created the CNP
(In Portuguese, Conselho Nacional do Petroleo), the only entity responsible for exploring
oil from 1938 to 1953.12 Afterwards, from 1953 to 1997, only one company was allowed to
drill for oil in Brazil: the government-controlled Petrobras13. Petrobras is an integrated
exploration and production company whose activities reach all phases of the oil supply
chain. To be precise, under certain circumstances other oil companies could explore oil in
Brazil, but only in partnership with Petrobras. Following the oil crisis in 1973, Petrobras
and other oil companies could sign a so-called \risk contract" to explore specic areas be-
tween 1975 and 1987. The terms of the contracts varied, but usual aspects included that
the oil found under this type of contract could not be exported and that Petrobras could
explore simultaneously an adjacent area by itself14. There is a sharp contrast in terms of
ownership of resources between the United States in Brazil. There are thousands of oil
companies with various business models in the U.S.15, while Brazil has been historically
linked with Petrobras's monopoly.
Local governments had little space to inuence Petrobras (or CNP) on where to search
for oil and on the speed of drilling. First, Petrobras (as a National Oil Company) fol-
lowed national goals that may be not correlated with local-level objectives. Petrobras
had a long-term goal, namely, achieving Brazil's self-suciency in oil production (inde-
pendent of preferences of the local authorities). Second, several factors which inuence
the exploration activity are determined exogenously such as the international price of oil
(Mohn and Osmundsen (2008)). Third, Petrobras knew it could only drill in locations with
selected geological characteristics. One concern might be that Petrobras' \risk contract"
partners might have been local companies with a local agenda. However, the large ma-
jority of those contracts were signed with prot-maximizing multinational oil companies.
Three smaller Brazilian companies also signed exploration contracts with Petrobras. Out
12According to Federal Law n. 395/38, private oil companies could only operate via concessions given
by CNP. Anecdotal evidence point out that it was dicult to operate in Brazil as a private oil company
at that time.
13Petrobras was created in 1953 by Federal Law n. 2,004/53. In 1954, Petrobras began its exploration
activities. Constitutional Amendment 09/1995 and Federal Law 9,478/97 changed the upstream industry
in Brazil: after 1997, the upstream oil market was open to national and foreign oil rms and Petrobras
started to face competition. Nowadays, Petrobras is one of the largest oil companies in the world. Petro-
bras is a leading company in oil exploration with contributions to technology, especially of deep water
exploration.
14The rst contracts were signed in 1976 through a public bidding of 10 areas to explore oil. Out of the
10 areas, 9 were oshore and 1 was in the Amazon basin. More than 100 risk contracts were signed during
12 years. According to the contracts, if oil was found, it should be sold to the internal market until the
country reached its self-suciency in oil production. Brazil reached its self-suciency three decades later,
in 2006.
15Institutions such as the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the Independent Petroleum
Association of America report the existence of several thousand oil operators in the U.S. economy.
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of these three companies, only one was a government-owned company: the \Paulipetro"
created in 1979 by S~ao Paulo state16. Between 1980 and 1983, Paulipetro drilled 33 wells
in one specic area. The drilling attempts lead to only one discovery well, but a non-
economical one (Bosco (2003)). Apart from Petrobras, Paulipetro drilling had support of
other national-level institutions such as the CPRM (Brazil's Mineral Resource Research
Company). Even guided by state-level goals, Paulipetro attempts were probably not linked
to any local-level (local governments') inuence and either way proved unsuccessful.
The Brazilian oil sector has experienced a substantial development from 1940 onwards.
In 1939 the rst onshore eld was discovered (but non-commercial) and in 1941 the rst
onshore commercial producer well was drilled. The rst oil discovery from an oshore well
took place in 1968. In 2011, Brazil was the world's 13th largest producer of oil and gas
with 2.2 millon barrels per day, which represents 2.6% of the total produced worldwide.
Brazil was the world's 14th position in terms of proven petroleum reserves in the same
year (ANP (2012)). The size of the oil sector is relevant to the Brazilian economy: in 2011
the oil sector represented 12% of the total Gross Domestic Product (CNI (2012)). Figure
1 summarizes domestic and international events related to oil exploration and production
in Brazil.
The oil business is crucial to several municipalities. Out of the top 10 municipalities
with highest per capita GDP, several of them have their main economic activity associ-
ated with upstream or downstream oil industry. Municipalities in the top 10 list include
S~ao Francisco do Conde (with a renery17), Triunfo (petrochemicals industry), Quissam~a,
Campos, and Macae (the last three municipalities linked to oshore production). Anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that municipalities which discovered large amounts of oil underwent a
signicant transformation and substantial economic growth. For example, Macae, a shing
municipality, transformed from a rural place to a very urban place after Petrobras discov-
ered oshore oil in the area and located some of its key production facilities in Macae
in the 1970's. There are also anecdotes of Petrobras hiring hundreds and thousands of
rural workers to join drilling expeditions. In the 1960's, the municipality of Carmopolis,
located in a historically sugarcane producing area, discovered oil. Since then, Carmopolis
has changed its main business due to the presence of Petrobras and related oil service com-
panies. Carmopolis has presented a high GDP growth even though there are complains
regarding the lack of connection between oil service rms and the community18. The mu-
nicipality of Alagoinhas in Bahia discovered oil in 1964. A number of successive discovery
wells lead Petrobras to locate some of its facilities in Alagoinhas in the late 1960s. Anec-
16S~ao Paulo is the largest state in Brazil both in terms of population (22% of the Brazilian total
population in 2010) and gross domestic product (33% of the Brazilian total GDP in 2008).
17The rst renery was constructed in 1949 in the municipality of S~ao Francisco do Conde (located in
Bahia state). The renery is called RLAM (Renaria Landulpho Alves-Mataripe) and is located near the
very rst wells that discovered oil in the country.
18See http://www.u.br/macaeimpacto/OFICINAMACAE/
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dotal evidence suggests that this lead to rapid economic growth in the area, particularly in
the services sector. Alagoinhas became a services hub for the surrounding municipalities
and large commercial outts located there.19
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the development of GDP per capita for the period 1940-2000
in the states of Sergipe (onshore production), Rio de Janeiro (oshore production) and
Bahia (rst state to discover oil), respectively. For each state, the graphs illustrate the
evolution of GDP of municipalities with and without oil. It can be seen that a wedge in
GDP per capita between oil producing municipalities and those without oil production
emerges over the years. Furthermore, the timing seems to correspond quite closely to the
development of the oil sector in each respective state. At a rst pass, oil production thus
seems to substantially increase local GDP. Two questions arise from this. Firstly, is the
observed correlation causal? And secondly, how does the non-oil sector develop? Since oil
extraction is a very high value added activity, local GDP mechanically increase when oil is
produced, bar any extreme \Dutch Disease" eect. We are interested in assessing whether
the spillovers of oil production to other sectors are positive or negative.
An important warning is related to the distribution of oil windfalls. Royalties and other
forms of \government take" are collected from both onshore and oshore oil production.
By and large, a company that produces oil must allocate part of the value of the gross
output in the form of royalties. Royalties are then divided among the three administrative
levels in Brazil. The distribution of royalties started in 1953, but it represented only a very
small fraction of local governments' budget. Only after 1997 (Federal Law n. 9,496/1997),
did royalties start to represent a signicant amount of revenue to local government. In
the robustness exercise, we restrict our analysis to the years 1940-1996 to capture only
the direct eect of oil production rather than the indirect eect through royalties. See
Appendix C for an overview and discussion of Royalties.
In the next section we discuss the identication strategy used to retrieve the eect of
oil discoveries on growth of local economies in Brazil.
3 Research Design
We are interested in the impact of oil discoveries on local economic development. We
study this question by dening the analysis in terms of the treatment evaluation litera-
ture where we see oil production as our treatment of interest and oil discoveries as the
assignment to treatment. In this section, we detail our research design which is based on
exploiting the quasi-random nature of oil discoveries. Our research design exploits un-
confounded assignment and we perform several exercises to guarantee adequate overlap
between the treatment and control group (strong ignorability as in Rosenbaum and Rubin
19See http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alagoinhas
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(1983)). While it is common in the literature on natural quasi-experiments to match on
observable variables, our research design additionally provides several strategies to \match
on unobservables". We start by describing the data and then discuss the exogeneity of
oil discovery and its relation to the treatment assignment. We then turn to the issue of
balance in the covariate distributions between treatment and control groups.
3.1 Data
The data on drilling is from Age^ncia Nacional do Petroleo, Gas Natural e Biocombustveis
(ANP), the Brazilian oil and gas industry regulator. The well dataset contains detailed
information on the drilling of 19,493 wells in Brazil spanning from 1940 to 2000. The
dataset contains the latitude and longitude coordinates of the well, so we are able to know
the exact location of each well. The dataset also has information on the exact date of
the drilling, on the result of the drilling (whether oil was found, whether the well is a dry
hole, whether only water was found, or whether the well was abandoned because of an
accident20). Furthermore, we have information on the viability of exploring the oil deposit
(when oil was found), and on whether the oil company started production.
The richness of the well dataset allows us to study several possibilities regarding the
stages of oil extraction and production (upstream oil industry). Given the data, we are able
to separate places where drilling took place (J = 1) from places with no drilling (J = 0).
We can also obtain information on places with oil discoveries (Z) and with oil production
(D). As a rst step we created a dummy variable for drilling (J), two dierent dummy
variables for discovery (Z), and a dummy for well production (D). The dummies for
drilling and production follow immediately from the well data. The drilling dummy equals
one when at least one well was drilled in the municipality and the production dummy is
one when there is at least one producer well in the municipality. In terms of discoveries,
there are several possibilities as the data allow us to dierentiate between a eld discovery,
a subeld (reservoir) discovery and a eld extension discovery. We dene two dierent
discovery dummies as follows. Firstly, \All Discoveries": the dummy is one when at least
one eld, subeld or eld extension discovery was made in the municipality. Secondly,
\True Discoveries": The dummy is one when at least one eld or subeld discovery and
at least one eld extension discovery was made in the municipality. The rationale for the
latter is that any substantial discovery includes a eld or subeld discovery and subsequent
eld extension discoveries to delineate the size of the oil eld (see Appendix B). For now
20We obtain more the 50 dierent classications from the dataset, but we were able to aggregate all of
them to the following major categories: discovery of a eld or subeld (reservoir), extension of a eld or
subeld, producer, non-feasible production, dry holes, abandoned, and well used for injection of water,
steam or gas. The data dierentiate between oil well, gas well, and oil and gas well. One limitation of
the dataset is that we do not have information on the amount of oil produced by each individual producer
well for the period of interest. Data on well production is available only from the 2000's onward.
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we will use the \All Discoveries" dummy to start with the most general possible denition
of discoveries.
The spatial unit of analysis is the Minimum Comparable Area (MCA). The Brazilian
federation has three administrative levels: federal government, states, and municipalities.
One complication when dealing with municipalities in Brazil is the process of detachments
and splits that took place over the years. For instance, in 1940 there were 1,574 municipal-
ities, while in 1997 there were 5,507 municipalities. In order to deal with the detachments,
we used the concept of MCAs. MCAs consist of sets of municipalities whose borders were
constant over the study period. Therefore, our data was aggregated to 1,275 Minimum
Comparable Areas (MCAs) in 1940. Figure 6 shows the boundaries of municipalities in
1997 and the correspondent MCAs in 1940. More on MCA aggregation can be found in
Da Mata, Deichmann, Henderson, Lall, and Wang (2007).
We allocate the wells into each MCA as follows. For onshore wells, we simply allocate
the wells that were within the boundaries of each MCA. For oshore wells, we calculate
the distance from each well to the nearest coastal MCA and allocate the oshore well to
the selected nearest MCA. Figure 7 shows the location of the assigned to treatment (see
Figure 7(a)) and of the treated locations (see Figure 7(b)).
Table 1 shows the number of wells discovered by decade. It contains information on the
total number of discoveries, and on onshore and oshore discoveries. It also has information
on the total number of units assigned to treatment over time. Table 2 shows the number of
wells by category. Wells are classied broadly as exploratory wells and development wells.
Exploratory wells are drilled to test for the presence of oil, while wells drilled inside the
known extent of the eld are called development wells (e.g., producer wells)21. Unsuccessful
drilling is classied as a dry hole in both exploratory and development categories. See
Appendix B for a detailed explanation on the types of wells.
We have the following numbers regarding oil discoveries in Brazil:
 Total number of MCA units = 1,275
 All Discovery MCAs = 64
 True Discovery MCAs = 45
 Dry hole MCAs = 158
 Neighbors of discovery MCAs= 156
We work mainly with three outcome variables: population density, the urbanization
rate22 and per capita GDP (overall as well as sectoral). Data on total population, pop-
ulation located in urban areas, and total area of the municipality come from historical
Population Censuses. We also tabulated data on employment (total and sectoral) from
historical Population Censuses. Data on municipal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
21 Note that the two instruments (true discoveries and all discoveries) are all exploratory wells.
22The urbanization rate is the proportion of the population living in urban areas.
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on the share of manufacturing, agriculture, and services in GDP is from Ipeadata.23 Us-
ing this information, we construct our outcome variables to obtain a panel from 1940 to
2000. In 1941, the rst well started to produce oil, so the year 1940 is our pre-treatment
year. The panel data is balanced and we do not observe any attrition. However, the time
dimension is unequally spaced for GDP per capita. Because population Censuses where
historically only conducted every 10 years and there is no data on GDP for 1990 or 1991,
we end up with GDP per capita data for the years 1949, 1959, 1970, 1980, 1996 and 2000.
By contrast, our panel is virtually equally spaced for the other two dependent variables
(urbanization rate and population density): 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, 1996 and
2000.
Additionally we collected data on average temperature, average rainfall and average
altitude from Ipeadata24. Further data comprise latitude and longitude coordinates of the
MCAs as well as indicator variables regarding the location of the MCA (on the coast,
Amazon region, and semi-arid region).25 Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the
variables used in the analysis.
3.2 Treatment Assignment
As discussed in Section 2, Petrobras is a national company with no discernable local
preferences. Even in the unlikely event of inuence by local governments, Petrobras could
only drill in locations with selected geological characteristics and as our discussion above
highlighted even given adequate geological characteristics the chances of discovering oil are
still slim. Our data conrm that the probability of drilling and nding nothing is much
higher than the probability of drilling and nding oil or gas (see for instance Figure 5).
Therefore, we argue that conditional on geological characteristics, the discovery of oil is a
\lottery".
Our treatment assignment is thus the discovery of oil: the assignment is being eligible to
oil production via the discovery of oil. Our treatment assignment process has is very similar
to a randomization: several attempts to drill oil were made, but only in some wells oil was
discovered. Drilling took place in locations with selected geological characteristics with
little room for inuence by local governments. Conditional on geological characteristics, the
discovery of oil is exogenous, i.e., assignment to treatment is random. The group assigned
23GDP calculations are detailed in Reis, Tafner, Pimentel, Serra, Rei, Magalhaes, and Medina (2004).
GDP is deated using the national implicit price deator. In subsection 5.1, we use the composition of
GDP to argue that we capture a variation in real local GDP instead of a price eect by showing that oil
municipalities undergo an important structural transformation.
24Temperature is measured in degrees Celsius, precipitation in millimeters per month, and altitude in
meters.
25To construct the shapele of 1940 MCAs, we combined (i) the shapele of 1997 municipalities with
(ii) the matching between 1940 MCAs and the corresponding 1997 municipalities. From the shapele of
1940 MCAs, we constructed the geographical coordinates and indicator variables.
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to treatment include the locations with drilling and oil discoveries. The untreated (control)
group comprises the locations with drilling but no oil discoveries. Since the location of oil
reserves is determined by geology, selection into treatment is unlikely or impossible. In
other words, municipalities had no control over the assignment mechanism and thus could
not inuence their treatment regime.
We have some noncompliance with the assigned treatment, i.e., some locations discov-
ered but do not produce oil. We have information on whether a recently discovered oil
eld is economically viable to begin production. Viability depends to the largest extent
on the characteristics of the oil eld but potentially also on some local characteristics.
Part of the costs of producing oil may be systematically correlated with unobservable local
characteristics. For instance, existing infrastructure and institutional support from the
local and state governments might inuence the decision to produce oil at the margin.
As a result, the research design implies random assignment of locations to treatment and
control groups, but allows for non-random selection of participants into treatment (once
assigned to treatment). As part of our empirical strategy we will thus use discoveries as
an instrumental variable for production as explained below in Section 4.26
Given this discussion we can then dene the following categories of municipalities. We
have places assigned to treatment, i.e., places with drilling and discoveries (J = 1, Z = 1)
and other places with drilling but no discoveries (J = 1, Z = 0). After an exploratory well
indicates the discovery of an oil eld or subeld, other drilling attempts (called step-out
or delineation wells) are carried out to verify the size and viability of the eld or subeld.
The step-out wells generally indicate whether it is worth producing oil. The data show
places with drilling, discovery and no viable production (J = 1, Z = 1, D = 0), and
places with drilling, discovery and production (J = 1, Z = 1, D = 1). The drilling-
discovery-production locations are the group that actually received the treatment, which
includes only compliers since always-takers do not exist in this case27. Imperfect compliance
to treatment (drilling-discovery-no-production group) includes never-takers and dropouts
from the treatment.
3.3 Assessing the Design
Our research design is based on the idea that drilling took place only in locations with se-
lected geological features with no inuence from local governments. Nevertheless, one can
argue for instance that richer, more populous places (which need more oil consumption)
26Part of the non-compliance is due to MCAs discovering oil towards the end of our sample period but
only starting production after 2000.
27Compliers are those who have received the treatment solely because they were eligible, but would
not have received it otherwise (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996)). Always-takers are those who always
get treated, irrespective of whether assigned to the treatment or to the control group. Correspondingly,
never-takers are those who never get treated regardless of being assigned to treatment or control.
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could get the treatment more easily. We discussed thus far several points that support
the exogenous nature (in the viewpoint of local economies) of drilling in Brazil: the risky
characteristics of oil exploration, the self-suciency goal of Petrobras, and the concentra-
tion of drilling attempts in geological target areas in the Amazon and on the Coast (recall
gure 5). We now provide further evidence of a lack of relationship between drilling and
local characteristics.
Table 4 shows simple regressions between drilling attempts and pre-treatment charac-
teristics. We aim to show that there is no correlation between drilling and pre-treatment
characteristics. We consider our three main outcome variables (population density, urban-
ization, and per capita GDP) in the 1940's. We construct two variables related to drilling:
a dummy that equals 1 if any drilling attempt happened in 1940-2000 in each Minimum
Comparable Area (MCA) and another that equals the number of drilling attempts in each
MCA. Using dierent models, regressions (1), (3), (5) and (7) initially point out that pre-
treatment is correlated with the drilling dummy or count (but interestingly most of the
variation remains unexplained). However, when we use simple geographical controls in
regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8) such as coastal and Amazon indicators, the signicance
of the pre-treatment variables vanishes. The correlations of Table 4 strongly support the
patterns from Figure 5: drilling is determined by geological and geographic characteristics
and not by pre-treatment population, GDP, or urbanization dynamics.
As mentioned previously there are dierent ways for us to capture discoveries. Table
7 compares the predictive power of the \All Discoveries" and \True Discoveries" dummies
for explaining production. We include MCA and Year FE as well as the initial economic
conditions and baseline geographic controls with time-varying coecients. The \True
Discovery" dummy is more closely related to production. It has the higher t-statistic
and F-statistic, and its coecient also turns out to be larger. Since any substantial eld
discovery will be followed by a eld extension discovery, it is not surprising that the \True
Discovery" Dummy is more closely related to actual production.
For the \True Discovery" dummy to be valid it is not sucient to show that drilling is
uncorrelated with initial conditions but we have to check whether conditional on a discov-
ery, additional discoveries are also unrelated to local economic development. Specically,
if Petrobras tried harder to nd a eld extension discovery in a location which was growing
fast, or which had high demand, this would bias our results. Table 5 shows that this is not
the case. Unsurprisingly, drilling attempts increase signicantly after an initial discovery
was made in an MCA. A rst discovery is a strong signal and naturally Petrobras sub-
sequently intensies its eorts in that particular area. Importantly, however, there is no
indication that drilling increases more in MCAs with higher GDP per capita, more urban-
ized MCAs or more densely populated ones. Both initial drilling attempts and follow-up
drilling are thus orthogonal to local economic conditions.
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3.4 Assessing the Overlap of Covariates
Our baseline strategy to control for unobservables is to use municipalities where there was
drilling for oil but no discovery as our control group. However, even if an oil-discovery place
is sort of a \lottery winner", which would guarantee unconfoundedness, a lack of overlap
(or common support) would still be a threat to internal validity. Figure 5 shows that oil
deposits are not randomly distributed across the country, but rather concentrated in the
basin of the Amazon River (onshore wells) and on the Atlantic Coast (oshore wells).
To guarantee adequate overlap, we created a matched subsample of the \drilling but no
discovery" group. Propensity score matching (or trimming) is a common way to improve
overlap (Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)). The set of pre-treatment characteristics used in
the propensity score model includes: population density in 1940, urbanization rate in 1940,
GDP per capita in 1949, share of manufacturing out of the total GDP in 1949, share of
services in 1949, share of agriculture in 1949, three indicator variables for location (whether
the MCA is located in the coast, whether in the Semiarid region, and whether in the
Amazon region), historical average rainfall, historical average temperature and geographic
coordinates. One issue is whether the GDP variables in 1949 are really pre-treatment and
thus not a consequence of the treatment. Since the very large share of relevant discoveries
happened after the creation of Petrobras in 1953 (recall from Table 1 that only 9 wells
discovered oil during the 1940's), GDP variables in 1949 should not be a concern. We then
choose the 64 municipalities out of the set of \drilling but no discovery" with the highest
propensity score and call this control group \matched dry drilling".
As an alternative to using those municipalities where there was drilling but no discovery
as a control group we also use direct neighbors as one of our control groups. This is a
strategy widely employed in the literature. Neighbors are likely to have similar geographical
and institutional characteristics and are likely to be very similar across other unobservables.
Additionally, we consider all non-oil MCAs in oil states, all dry drilling MCAs which are
not neighbors of discovery MCAs (dry drilling, no neighbor) and a trimmed subsample of
the neighboring MCAs. The idea is to create multiple comparison groups to strengthen
the results.
Figure 8 shows several maps with the location of the control groups. Figure 8(a) displays
where drilling took place, while Figure 8(b) shows the overlap of drilling and discoveries.
Therefore, from Figure 8(b) one can verify the set of MCAs where drilling took place and
no oil was found. Figure 8(c) displays the matched dry-hole subpopulation. Additionally,
Figure 8(d) shows the location of the neighbors of the oil MCAs, while Figure 8(e) shows
the matched neighbors subpopulation.
We investigate systematic dierence between the treatment and the control groups.
Rubin (2001) proposes a set of criteria to check for overlap. In this paper, we use the
normalized (or standardized) dierence to assess the dierence in location in the covari-
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ate distributions (Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)). The normalized dierence (ND) for
continuous variables is given by
ND =
t   cp
2t + 
2
c
;
where t and 
2
t is the mean and variance of the treated group, and c and 
2
c are the
corresponding values for the control group. The ND for dichotomous variables is dened
as
ND =
pt   pcp
pt(1  pt) + pc(1  pc)
;
where pt and pc are the proportions (prevalence) for the treated and control group respec-
tively. Standardized dierences are not inuenced by sample size, unlike t-tests and other
statistical tests.
Table 6 shows the results of this assessment. Matched dry drilling and matched neigh-
bors are the best control group based on observables. It is useful to emphasize that while
it improves internal validity, the matching may reduce the external validity of the results
because we are now focusing on a subset of the original sample (Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009)).
An implicit assumption in the analysis is the stable unit treatment value assumption
(Rubin (1980)), i.e., that there is no interference of the treatment on the control group. One
might fear spillovers from the intervention: in the presence of spillover eects, neighboring
locations may also receive part of the treatment. To alleviate doubts about spillovers we
have included the \dry drilling, no neighbor" group as one of our control groups. The next
section discusses the empirical strategy used to recover the main estimand of interest.
4 Estimation
We now briey discuss the empirical strategy to recover the impact of oil discoveries.
The estimand of interest is the Intention-to-Treat (ITT): the average impact of being
assigned to treatment. Let yi is the potential outcome for local economy i and let the
indicator of treatment assignment be Zi = f0; 1g. The ITT estimand is represented by
ITT = E[yijZi = 1]   E[yijZi = 0]. We discuss what conditions (identifying assumption)
must be met to estimate a ITT parameter.
In the discussion below, the oil discovery dummy is represented by Zit (treatment
assignment): Zit equals 1 if oil was discovered in the MCA unit i in period t. We represent
the oil production dummy by Dit (the actual treatment). Notice that we can run regression
using either Zit or Dit as the treatment indicator. A regression using Zit is an intent-to-
treat (ITT) analysis, while a regression using Dit is an as-treated (AT) regression. We will
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discuss both ITT and AT regressions in this section.
We assume an additive and linear empirical specication to estimate an ITT eect as
follows:
Yit = + ITTZit + 
0
tXi + i + t + it; (1)
where Yit is the outcome variable, Xi are time-invariant MCA characteristics including
the pre-treatment level of the dependent variables, it is an error term, t are year xed
eects and i denotes MCA xed eects. The time span t goes from 1940 to 2000. The
(exogenous) source of cross-sectional and time variation is given by the discovery of oil in
unit i at time t. As a result, the parameter 
ITT
should capture an intent-to-treat eect.
Note that ITT is considered a lower bound for the average treatment eect. We add i to
capture time-invariant characteristics and t to capture common aggregate shocks that hit
all locations.
After matching by using the propensity score, model dependence is not eliminated but
will normally be reduced. Parametric procedures have the potential to improve causal
inferences even after matching when the match is not exact (Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart
(2007)). Therefore, we use a set of additional covariates Xi in equation (1). In other words,
including the set of covariates Xi allows us to control for remaining dierences between
treated and control groups that are unrelated to the discovery of oil. Notice that the
trimming used to create the control groups also helps with the common trend assumption.
Lastly, note that policy variation takes place at the MCA level and errors may be
correlated within the spatial units. Therefore, standard errors are clustered at the MCA
level in all regressions (Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004)).28
In a second step we focus on the impact of oil production on the outcome variables.
Because we are interested in the impact of oil production, the estimand of interest now is the
treatment-on-the-treated (TOT): the average impact of oil on those municipalities which
produce it. Oil discovery is the variable that induces exogenous changes in the treatment
assignment, but oil production may be endogenous due to time-varying unobservables.
The regression to capture the eect producing oil Dit (AT Eect) is also assumed to be
additive and linear:
Yit =  + ATDit + 
0
tXi + i + t + it: (2)
Notice that Equation (2) captures an AT eect which is is not necessarily equivalent
to the TOT . As a consequence, the parameter 
AT
from Equation (2) will not produce an
28Time can be a threat for identication if discoveries took place in boom periods: places where oil was
discovered during a boom may have had a better opportunity to promote local growth. Our use of time
xed-eects helps to alleviate this issue. Additionally, the bulk of drilling activity (and some important
discoveries) took place in the 1980s, a decade labeled as the \lost decade" because of its low GDP growth.
Therefore, important discoveries did not happen during boom periods in Brazil.
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unbiased estimate of the treatment-on-the-treated parameter because oil production may
be endogenous due to time-varying unobservables. We need to consider the endogeneity by
estimating a regression using discovery as an instrumental variable for oil production (the
endogenous covariate). When we instrument Dit, we are estimating a specication that
should capture a LATE eect: the average eect of oil for compliers. The LATE estimand
is represented by LATE = E[Y1i   Y0ijD1i > D0i], where D1i is the treatment status of
location i when Zi = 1 (oil discovery) and D0i is the treatment status of location i when
Zi = 0 (no discovery).
Note that the following four conditions need to be satised for the instrumental variable
regressions to be valid: independence, monotonicity, exclusion restriction, and inclusion
restriction. Independence means the instrument should be as good as a random assignment.
We have discussed the independence assumption during the description of the research
design. Monotonicity implies that treatment eligibility can only make actual treatment
more likely, not less, i.e., if one participated when not eligible, one participates when
eligible. Monotonicity or \no-deers" assumption is plausible in our analysis because an
oil discovery does not make production less likely. The exclusion restriction assumption
requires that the instrument (oil discovery) aects our dependent variables (e.g. per capita
GDP) only through its eects on oil production. The exclusion restriction should hold, but
it is possible to devise scenarios when it fails to be veried. For example, knowledge that
the location was now eligible for oil production might cause it to change its expenditure on
public infrastructure, which might change GDP growth. Finally, the inclusion restriction
implies that the treatment assignment must predict who receives the actual treatment. In
the present analysis, the number of discovery wells highly predicts the number of production
wells and the discovery indicator highly predict the production indicator. 29
5 Results
This section is divided into four parts. The rst and main part discusses the baseline
results and a host of robustness exercises regarding the eects of oil discoveries. We then
show an additional subsection which compares onshore to oshore discoveries. The last
two parts discuss oil production and treatment intensity, and the link between upstream
and downstream oil production, respectively.
29Note that Figure 7 displays a clear relationship between discovery and production. There are only
two MCAs in the dataset that receive the treatment without being eligible, i.e., that produce oil without
any discovery within its boundaries. Even though there was no discovery in those two MCAs, they have
step-out wells used to delineate a oil eld discovered in a neighbor MCA. In other words, the non-eligible
MCAs contains few step-out/delineation wells (6 wells in total) from an oil eld discovered in an adjacent
MCA. The results are robust to the exclusion of these two MCAs. See Appendix B for a discussion on the
various types of wells.
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5.1 ITT Results
As discussed in the estimation section (see Section 4), we include MCA and year xed
eects and cluster standard errors at the MCA level in all regressions. Additionally we
control for geographic characteristics and initial conditions with time varying coecients.
Controls included in all regressions are: per capita GDP in 1949, Urbanization rate in
1940, Population Density in 1940, Latitude, Longitude, a dummy for being in the Amazon
area and a dummy for being on the coast.
Results for Socio-Economic Variables. Table 8 shows the baseline ITT results
using the \All Discovery" dummy as our treatment assignment. We show results for our
preferred control group (matched dry drilling) as well as for the full dry drilling sample.
The key independent variable is a dummy and both per capita GDP and population density
are expressed as logs. Therefore, we can interpret the coecient in those regressions as a
percentage change. Urbanization is a rate bounded between 0 and 1 so that we can interpret
the coecient on oil production as a change in percentage points. GDP per capita increases
by 12.5-14.6% over a 60 year period as a result of oil discoveries. Population density and
the urbanization rate are unaected by oil discoveries in this specication.
As discussed previously the \All Discovery" dummy has some drawbacks both concep-
tually as well as in terms of its ability to predict oil production. The \True Discoveries"
dummy excludes MCAs where initially oil was discovered but then there were no follow-up
discoveries, i.e. the oil eld was very small, as well as MCAs where there was no eld dis-
covery but only a eld extension, i.e. the bulk of the eld lies in a dierent municipality.30
Table 9 shows the baseline ITT results using our preferred treatment assignment. Unsur-
prisingly, the coecients are markedly higher than in Table 8. The increase in per capita
GDP is estimated at 24.6-25.9%. While population density is not signicantly aected, ur-
banization increases by 4.3-4.4% points over the period as a consequence of oil discoveries.
In other words, when we compare municipalities with signicant discoveries to municipal-
ities where Petrobras drilled for oil and either did not nd any or made no substantial
discovery then we nd a strong positive impact on per capita GDP and urbanization.
Robustness. Table 10 shows that this result is both quantitatively and qualitatively
robust to using alternative control groups. Our additional control groups are: all non-
oil MCAs in oil discovery states, dry drilling MCAs which are not adjacent to discovery
MCAs (which we call dry drilling, no neighbor), all MCAs which are adjacent to discovery
MCAs and a matched subsample of adjacent MCAs (matched neighbors). The results for
the dry drilling, no neighbor control group are reassuring in the sense that any potential
spillovers should be particularly limited for this group. The matched neighbors group
30Implicitly, other recent papers on the impacts of oil abundance have also dened relevant discoveries.
For example, Michaels (2011) uses a threshold of 100 millions barrels of reserves and Allcott and Keniston
(2013) use a cuto of a production of $100 U.S. dollars per habitant.
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on the other hand is susceptible to spillovers but oers a good control group in terms of
observable MCA characteristics (see Table 6). Overall, the results are remarkably similar
across control groups, perhaps highlighting that our controls and the parametric tting
(the linear and additive specication represented by Equation (1)) are doing a good job
in providing a precise estimate of the eects of oil on the municipalities in Brazil.31 The
estimate for per capita GDP ranges from 19.5-26.2% while urbanization is estimated to
increase 3.6-5.2% as a consequence of oil discoveries.32
Our baseline results are also robust to including the additional geographic controls
which are available, namely average temperature and average rainfall over the last 50
years, average altitude of the MCA, and a dummy for being located in a semiarid region.
As can be seen in Table 11 the impact of oil discoveries on per capita GDP is marginally
lower than in the analogous regressions without the additional controls. However, since
the overall t barely improves and the coecients on the additional controls tend to be
insignicant we prefer to exclude them to avoid a problem of over-controlling. Either way,
including them only somewhat changes the results quantitatively but not qualitatively in
all specications. Lastly, we verify that changing the time period to 1940-1996 does not
change the results. Table 12 shows that the results are virtually the same when we set
1996 as the nal year. This is important because it supports the claim that our ndings
are driven by the direct eect of oil production rather than the indirect eect through
royalties (recall the discussion in Subsection 2.2).
Sectoral GDP Results. While the results for urbanization point in a dierent direc-
tion, there might be a concern that the increase in GDP per capita is purely mechanical in
the sense that there are no spillovers from oil production to other sectors of the economy.
To investigate this, Table 13 shows the impact of oil discoveries on sectoral GDP. GDP is
broken up into manufacturing, services and agriculture. Natural resource extraction is in-
cluded in the manufacturing sector. While ideally we would like to decompose this further
the data does not allow us to do so. As such it is not surprising or particularly insightful
that manufacturing GDP increases signicantly with oil discoveries. Importantly, how-
ever, services GDP increases by about 20% while agricultural GDP is unaected.33 This
is interesting for two reasons. First of all, it is reassuring in terms of our research design,
that agricultural GDP is not aected. An increase in agricultural GDP might have raised
the doubt that we are mainly picking up local price eects rather than changes in real
municipal GDP. Secondly, the results suggests that there are spillovers from oil discoveries
to the services sector. A candidate for a channel might be direct demand from oil rms and
high-paid oil workers. In terms of thinking about a test of local dutch disease the result
31Results are also robust to excluding major urban centers, i.e. state capitals.
32We also constructed trimmed (rather than matched) subsamples of the dry drilling and neighbors
control groups. Results are robust to using those.
33we cannot comment of the impact of oil discoveries on non-oil manufacturing
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that agricultural GDP is not aected is also interesting. Agricultural output is a tradable
and as such might be expected to decrease if a strong local cost eect were present.
Labor Productivity. To investigate the sectoral GDP results in more detail, we
collected data on sectoral employment by municipality going back to 1940 using historical
censuses. We then constructed a rough measure of labor productivity by dividing the
sectoral GDP data by the sectoral employment data for every MCA.34 We thus obtain
sectoral labor productivity data for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1996 and
2000.35
Table 14 shows that oil discoveries increase labor productivity in the manufacturing
sector by slightly over 20% (recall again that this includes oil production) and labor pro-
ductivity in the services sector by roughly 20%. The agricultural sector in not aected.
While the result is signicant for the services sector for both control groups it is marginally
insignicant at conventional levels in one of the two regressions for the manufacturing sec-
tor. Comparing the estimated coecients with the increases in sectoral GDP per capita
which we documented in Table 13 it seems that while the increase in services GDP is largely
accounted for by increased productivity, the manufacturing sector is also experiencing an
increase in employment. These results are consistent with the anecdotal evidence we dis-
cussed in Section 2.2. Oil discovering municipalities become local services and commerce
hubs for the surrounding area, with these large outts presenting a signicantly higher
labor productivity than the traditional small scale service providers.36
Summary of Baseline Results. Taken together, our baseline results suggest that
local GDP per capita and urbanization increase signicantly as a result of oil discoveries.
While the increase in GDP per capita we document is large, the ITT estimates lie within
the range estimated for the United States in the literature. Michaels (2011) nds that
income is 05-28 log points higher in oil abundant counties than non-oil counties in the US
south. He also shows that population density is 30-100 log points higher in oil abundant
counties. Allcott and Keniston (2013) look at the impact of resource booms in the US
and also nd strong results: resource booms increase both labor income (by about 0.3-0.5
percent points per year during a boom) and employment density (by 60-80 percent) in
treated counties. As far as we are aware there are no previous reliable estimates for the
impact of oil discoveries on local economic variables for developing countries. We nd
that the increase is services GDP is driven by increased productivity but the increase in
manufacturing GDP must also be driven by an increase in employment.
We do not nd a statistically signicant increase in population density but we do
34This is valid if we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, for example.
35Since GDP data is available for 1949 and 1959 but employment data for 1950 and 1960, we use the
1949 and 1959 GDP data to get estimates of the 1950 and 1960 labor productivity.
36The results for sectoral GDP and labor productivity are robust to all of the above robustness exercises
but we do not report those tables in the interest of space. Tables are available from the authors upon
request.
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document an increase in urbanization.37 Our sectoral GDP results indicate that oil munic-
ipalities might be experiencing a move from rural agricultural activities to service provision
in the city. Migration as a consequence of oil production in Brazil seems to have been from
the countryside to the city within the same MCA rather than from non-oil MCAs to oil
MCAs. Inter-municipal migration ows in Brazil tended to be mainly from the northeast
of the country to the big urban centers in the southeast (Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro),
and not within regions (de Lima Amaral (2013)).
In the remainder of this section, we proceed as follows. We rst split discoveries into
onshore and oshore and show that only onshore discoveries seem to have signicant pos-
itive spillovers on average. We then use an alternative empirical strategy and estimate a
regression which allows us to retrieve the Local Average Treatment Eect of oil produc-
tion. Additionally, we investigate treatment intensity. Lastly, we explore the connection
between downstream and upstream oil production and show that our results are robust to
excluding municipalities with large processing production facilities such as reneries and
main storage and transportation hubs. In the interest of space, we only report tables for
our preferred control group (matched dry drilling) from now on, but as before all results
are very stable across dierent control groups and all results are available upon request.
5.2 Onshore versus Oshore Discoveries
We distinguish between onshore and oshore discoveries since some of the channels which
we believe can lead to spillovers (such as the physical presence of well paid oil workers)
might be more obviously present for onshore than for oshore locations. In fact, the
oshore production is very concentrated of the coast of Rio de Janeiro, and most personnel
is stationed in the municipality of Macae.
GDP per capita in the manufacturing sector increases signicantly in both onshore
and oshore municipalities. However, when we focus on our measures of spillovers, namely
productivity in the services sector and the urbanization rate, we see that neither of those is
aected by oshore discoveries, but there is a large positive impact of onshore discoveries.
Labor productivity in the services sector increases by 28% while the urbanization rate
increases by over 5% points. (see Tables 15 and 16). The increase in manufacturing GDP
shows that oshore discoveries do increase GDP in a mechanical sense. However, we do
not nd any impact on the local economy. It is also worth pointing out, however, that
the estimated increase in manufacturing GDP is very similar for onshore and oshore
discoveries, perhaps indicating that the impact of oil discoveries on non-oil manufacturing
is rather limited also for onshore discoveries.
While assigning onshore discoveries to municipalities is straightforward, the mapping is
37The result on population density is conrmed when instead we use overall employment density.
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not as clear for oshore discoveries (see Section 3.1). To verify whether the oshore result
is driven by our measure of oshore discoveries we used an alternative one: facing areas.
Facing areas are calculated by the Brazilian Oil and Gas regulator (ANP) to calculate
royalties. It is a complex measure, but, as the name suggests, essentially captures whether
a municipality's maritime borders face an oil eld (see Monteiro and Ferraz (2012) for a
detailed discussion). The resulting measure is substantially broader than ours, since only
one MCA can be the closest to a well, but many MCAs can potentially face it. It thus is
ex-ante less likely to pick up spillovers from production. The correlation between the two
measures of oshore discoveries is 0.53. We re-ran the regressions using the alternative
measure of oshore discoveries but the results are unchanged.
5.3 Oil Production and Treatment Intensity
We now turn to estimating the impact of oil production rather than oil discoveries on
economic outcomes. There are 46 municipalities which have at least one oil production well.
As noted above production might be endogenous. In a rst step we thus instrument for a
production indicator using our discoveries indicator to recover a Local Average Treatment
Eect. Table 17 qualitatively conrms our earlier ITT results. The estimated coecients
are, as expected, larger. GDP per capita increases by over 40% and urbanization by over 6%
points as a consequence of oil production. Similarly, the impact on sectoral GDP is larger.38
It is intuitive that the ITT results are scaled up by the proportion of compliers. Since the
producing municipalities are not a perfect subset of the true discovery municipalities the
instrumental variables specication is not our favourite one and we prefer to report the
ITT results as a safe lower bound on the treatment eect.
In a second step we try to measure the eect of treatment intensity. We ask how the
outcome is related to the \dose" of the treatment. The literature on treatment intensity
emphasizes the estimation of a weighting function to capture which group or observation is
contributing the most to the results (e.g., Angrist and Imbens (1995), Frolich and Lechner
(2010)). In the spirit of Angrist and Imbens (1995), our goal is to estimate a coecient that
can be interpreted as a weighted-average of per-unit treatment eect. We thus estimate
the following equation
Yit = + prodit + 
0
tXi + i + t + it: (3)
where we instrument the number of production wells (prodit) with the number of discovery
wells (eld, subeld and eld extension wells) ((discit)).
39 As an alternative measure of
38Same for sectoral labor productivity (not reported).
39We obtained production data by eld from ANP for the year 2000 to construct production volume by
MCA and compare it to the number of production wells. While the correlation between the two is high,
it is higher for onshore than oshore production, for example.
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treatment intensity, we use the number of injection wells. Reservoir's pressure is a key
element in oil production because it drives oil and gas out of the reservoir. Normally, af-
ter some time, pressure decreases and the oil company needs to (articially) add pressure
to the well. The oil company then starts to drill \injection wells" to inject water, gas,
chemicals or steam to supplement falling pressure. Injection wells give us indirect informa-
tion on the producing life of the oil eld because injection wells are used only to enhance
production. Oil companies design an optimal distribution of injection wells to optimize
long-term extraction: enhanced recovery is so important in the petroleum industry that the
location of the producer well is chosen with the injection well in mind. Eorts to enhance
production are costly and are dependent upon the potential oil recovery volume. In other
words, it is only viable to design injection wells to enhance production above a certain
level. Therefore, we use injection wells as a measure of treatment intensity.40 Note that
while the t-statistic on the number of discovery wells in the rst stage is always very high,
the F-Statistic for the GDP regressions are not particularly strong, indicating a potential
weak instrument problem.
The sign in the various regressions is as before and so we focus on quantifying the
average per unit eect on GDP per capita and urbanization. The results are reported in
Table 18. GDP per capita increases by 0.066% per production well and by roughly 1%
per injection well. The urbanization rate increases by 0.007% per production well and by
0.15% per injection well. The coecients on production wells are quite small. With the
average producer MCA having 150 production wells this gives an average impact of oil
production of 150*0.0007=10.5%<20%. On the other hand, the coecients for injection
wells seem very large. This is a consequence of their ability to isolate the large production
elds very well. In fact only a handful of large elds onshore in the northeast and of the
coast of Rio de Janeiro have any signicant number of them. Our interpretation of these
results is that large discoveries have a disproportionately large impact and most of the
spillovers are potentially concentrated in municipalities with large oil elds.
5.4 Oil and Gas Processing Production Facilities
For a sample of U.S. counties Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) show that there
are important local spillovers from the opening of large manufacturing plants. This might
also hold true for large downstream oil production facilities such as reneries. Clearly,
the decision of where to locate such facilities is likely to be correlated with many unob-
servable local characteristics. We therefore do not aim to formally evaluate the impact
40Tabulations from Brazil support this fact. For the year 2000, for onshore elds, those MCAs with
discovery wells and injection wells have much higher production volume of both oil and gas than those
with discovery wells but without injection wells. In other words, in the data those MCAs with injection
wells are the ones with a lot of production.
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of downstream production on local economic development, but we want to test whether
downstream production facilities are driving most of our observed results.
To investigate this hypothesis we collected data on the location and date of construc-
tion of all reneries, directly oil related factories (such as petrochemicals plants) and oil
terminals. We also collected data on thermoelectric power plants, which are associated
with the oil and gas industry.41 So far, we have focused on the upstream oil and gas indus-
try (i.e., exploration and production of oil). We now complement this analysis by looking
at the role of the downstream industry in Brazil (processing and transportation facilities).
By the year 2000 there were 15 reneries or directly oil related factories, 18 onshore oil
terminals, 22 oshore terminals and 2 thermoelectric power plants in Brazil. Using this
data we constructed an indicator which equals 1 if an MCA has at least one of those oil
related production facilities. Figure 9 shows the distribution of these production facilities
in the Brazilian territory. To evaluate the link between the upstream and downstream oil
sector we regress the production facilities dummy on the indicator for \True Discoveries".
As before a full set of controls is included. Additionally, we again include MCA and year
xed eect and cluster standard errors at the MCA level. Regardless of the control group,
the coecient on the discovery dummies is positive and signicant. Discoveries increase
the probability of hosting a downstream facility by roughly 10% which is not negligible
but not overwhelming either. This rises to 15% when we and ad-hoc measure for large
discoveries (top 20 in the year 2000 in terms of number of discovery wells), see Table 19.
We also collected data provided by ANP (2001) detailing which municipalities they
classify as the main production and main production support sites, respectively. The idea
is to perform an additional test of the hypothesis that production facilities are more likely
to be located in MCAs which discovered large reserves of oil. Main production sites are
dened as locations with facilities for processing, treating, storing and transporting oil.
Support sites are those with ports, airports, heliports, oces or similar facilities used to
support the extraction, production and processing of oil. We match this municipal data to
the relevant MCAs and then construct a new indicator at the MCA level. Unfortunately,
this data is only available for the year 2000 and we do not know the rst year in which
municipalities became main production or support sites. We, therefore, cannot use these
variables in a panel regression. Nevertheless it is worth pointing out that the correlations
between having had a discovery and being a main production or main production support
site are 0.2466 and 0.2747, respectively.
Taken together, the above oers support for the hypothesis that discoveries tend to
lead to the establishment of downstream production facilities in an MCA. To evaluate
the pure impact of the upstream sector we thus exclude those municipalities which host
41Information on the construction date of each renery, each onshore and oshore terminal is from Petro-
bras and Transpetro. Information on the construction date of petrochemical plants and thermoelectric
power plants is from Petrobras and various online sources.
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a downstream production facility from both the treatment and the control group and re-
estimate our baseline specication. As can be seen by comparing Table 20 with Tables
9 and 13 the results do not seem to be driven by downstream production facilities only.
Upstream oil production thus directly impacts the local economy, even when it generates
no signicant royalties and does not lead to the establishment of downstream production
facilities.
6 Conclusion
We investigated the eects of natural resource extraction on economic growth and urban-
ization in a developing economy in transition. The focus is on how oil discoveries aect
the performance of local economies (municipalities) in Brazil during the period from 1940
to 2000. The main result is that oil production has an average positive impact on local per
capita GDP. The lower bound of our results shows that oil production increases local per
capita GDP by 12.5-27.3%, but has no statistically signicant impact on local population
density. In most specication urbanization is estimated to increase by about 4% points.
Moreover, the composition of GDP is aected by oil discoveries. Especially the increase
in services GDP we document oers support for the hypothesis that there are positive
agglomeration spillovers. Labor productivity in the services sector is estimated to increase
by over 20% as a result of oil discoveries. The size of the discovery seems important in
determining the magnitude of the eects.
Our paper provides a contribution to the literature on the eects of natural resources
and is the rst paper that uses a quasi-experimental research design based on the outcome
of drilling. It has been dicult to isolate the eects of natural resources because of endo-
geneity problems. Our quasi-experimental design uses exogenous variation in oil discovery
to identify the impacts of oil on local economies. Our design is particular suited to the
Brazilian setting and might be less appropriate for other institutional environments, such
as the U.S. and Canada, where individual wildcatters (explorationists) played an important
role in hydrocarbon exploration of local economies.
Even though our design allows us to discuss several threats to internal validity, our
matching of observations reduces the external validity of the results. Besides, the results
are for a specic institutional framework given that we are studying only one country.
Nevertheless, we can draw some general lessons from our empirical exercise. Specically,
being able to control for endogeneity allows us to comment on the direction of correlation
observed in cross-country studies. Take the case of the relationship between oil and urban-
ization. Oil can impact urbanization by attracting rural workers to activities related to the
supply of goods and services to the oil industry chain. Urbanization can also impact the oil
industry: urban agglomerations demand oil and thus impact oil industry. In the present
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application, oil is exogenously discovered and we can identify its impact on urbanization.
In summary, our results do not support the view that oil production is per se a curse.
Overall, oil production seems to be benecial for local economic growth, even in a develop-
ing country. Our results do not apply at the national level, however, since our identication
strategy controls for national policies and institutions. It would also be interesting to ex-
plicitly analyse the impact on non-oil manufacturing but, unfortunately, the data does not
allow us to do so. Exploring the direct and indirect spillovers from oil production to other
manufacturing sectors by exploiting a quasi-experiment would be an interesting topic for
future research. Since local oil windfall (royalties) only played a very minor role in Brazil
during our period of analysis our results must be driven by direct market eects rather
than indirect channels. How the government can use oil rents to improve living standards
is an important but dierent question.
One policy implication of our work would be to consider encouraging small and medium
sized rms to enter the oil sector in Brazil. With ownership concentration, the Marshalian
agglomeration eects (thick input, labor and ideas markets) are also likely to be con-
centrated. We showed that Petrobras tends to concentrate its downstream production
facilities in those localities with particularly large discoveries. Furthermore, (i) sta em-
ployed in upstream operations (e.g., construction, maintenance, seismic personnel) and (ii)
manufacturers of equipment, inspection companies, specialized construction and mainte-
nance personnel are usually all located in a few big urban areas linked to the oil sector.
Deconcentration of the oil sector may be key to further stimulate the local economy of oil
discovering municipalities. Indeed, in 1997 Petrobras' monopoly was broken and there are
now many more private oil companies operating in Brazil. Recently, there have been plans
by ANP (the oil regulator in Brazil) to allow bidding (concession auctions) for selected
areas exclusively by small and medium oil companies. The future impact of this process
might oer some indications for the potential of small and medium oil companies and local
entrepreneurship to stimulate local economic development.
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A Figures and Tables
Fig. 1: Events and Oil Drilling: 1940-2011
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Notes. Figure show the cumulative of oil wells drilled in Brazil during the period from 1940 to 2011.
32
Fig. 2: GDP per capita in Sergipe: 1940-2000
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Notes. Figure shows the development of per capita GDP in municipalities which discovered oil and those
which did not discover oil in the state of Sergipe from 1940 to 2000. Sergipe is an important onshore
producer and the rst oil discovery took place in the mid 1960's.
Fig. 3: GDP per capita in Rio de Janeiro: 1940-2000
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Notes. Figure shows the development of per capita GDP in municipalities which discovered oil and those
which did not discover oil in the state of Rio de Janeiro from 1940 to 2000. Rio is the major oil producer
in Brazil (mainly oshore production) and the rst oil discovery took place in the late 1970's.
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Fig. 4: GDP per capita in Bahia: 1940-2000
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Notes. Figure shows the development of per capita GDP in municipalities which discovered oil and those
which did not discover oil in the state of Bahia from 1940 to 2000. The rst commercial oil well was
discovered in Bahia in 1941.
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Fig. 5: Location of Oil Wells in Brazil: 1940-2000
(a) Location of Oil Wells
(b) Oil Discovery (Red), Dry Wells (Yellow), Other (White)
Notes. The gures show the location of approximately 20,000 drilled wells (the universe of wells drilled
in Brazil during the period from 1940 to 2000). The gure shows the administrative boundaries of the 27
states that exist since 1988 in Brazil. (See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZKdnUeBcOI for a
short video on the geographic distribution of drilling activity in Brazil from 1940-2000.)
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Fig. 6: Municipalities and Minimum Comparable Areas (MCAs)
(a) 5,507 Municipalities in 1997
(b) 1,257 MCAs in 1940
Notes. Figure 6(a) shows the administrative boundaries of the 5,507 municipalities that existed in 1997
in Brazil. Figure 6(b) shows the aggregation to the 1,275 Minimum Comparable Areas (MCAs) in 1940.
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Fig. 7: Treatment, Discovery and Upstream Production of Oil
(a) Oil Discoveries (Red) (b) Discovery (Red) and Upstream Produc-
tion (Overlap Green)
Notes. MCAs in red are assigned to treatment, while MCAs in green received the treatment. Figures
show 1,275 Minimum Comparable Areas (MCAs) in 1940. The discovery dummy is the \All Discoveries"
dummy (which equals one when at least one eld, subeld or eld extension discovery was made within
the MCA's boundaries).
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Fig. 8: Control Groups: Drilling, Discoveries, Neighbors, and Matching
(a) Drilling (Yellow) (b) Discovery (Red), Drilling (Yellow)
(c) Discovery (Red) and Matched Dry
Drilling Sample (Yellow)
(d) Discovery (Red), Neighbors (Yel-
low)
(e) Discovery (Red) and Matched
Neighbors (Yellow)
Notes. Figures show 1,275 Minimum Comparable Areas (MCAs) in 1940. The discovery dummy is the
\All Discoveries" dummy (which equals one when at least one eld, subeld or eld extension discovery
was made in the municipality).
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Fig. 9: Processing Production Facilities
(a) Processing Facilities (Yellow) (b) Discovery (Red), Facilities (Yellow)
Notes. Figures show 1,275 Minimum Comparable Areas (MCAs) in 1940. The discovery dummy is the
\All Discoveries" dummy (which equals one when at least one eld, subeld or eld extension discovery
was made in the municipality).
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Table 1: Number of Discoveries by Decade
# of Wells: Discoveries Units Assigned to Treatment
Decade Total Onshore Oshore Total Onshore Oshore
1940 9 9 0 3 3 0
1950 48 48 0 8 8 0
1960 212 206 6 19 18 1
1970 203 117 86 13 4 16
1980 671 434 237 15 11 8
1990 285 158 127 6 2 5
Notes. Data from ANP (Brazilian oil and gas industry regulator). The units assigned to
treatment are Minimum Comparable Areas (MCAs). MCAs consist of sets of municipal-
ities whose borders were constant over the study period.
Table 2: Number of Wells by Category
Classication Category of Well Oshore Onshore Total
Exploratory Wells
Discovery of New Field 129 304 433
Discovery of New Subeld (Reservoir) 88 234 322
Discovery of Field Extension (Step-out) 258 419 677
Dry Hole 1,067 2,556 3,623
Development Wells
Producer 1,368 9,101 10,469
Carries Oil or Gas 7 1 8
Production Non-Feasible 327 521 848
Injection of Water, Steam or Gas 201 774 975
Dry Hole 73 1,017 1,090
Other
Abandoned 421 554 975
Special 62 369 431
Missing category 30 171 201
Total 3,809 15,684 19,493
Notes. Data from ANP (Brazilian oil and gas industry regulator). Wells are classied broadly as exploratory
wells and development wells. Exploratory wells are drilled to test for the presence of oil. If the exploratory
drilling has been proven unsuccessful, the well is classied as a dry hole. Wells to delineate the extension
of the oil eld (step-out wells) are also classied as exploratory wells. Every well drilled inside the known
extend of the eld is called development well (e.g., producer wells and injection wells). In the development
well category, unsuccessful drilling is also classied as a dry hole. Special wells are water wells or the ones
used for mineral research and experiments.
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Table 4: Correlation between Drilling Attempts and Pre-Treatment
Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Drilling Dummy Drilling Count
Linear Linear
Logit Logit
Linear Linear
Poisson Poisson
Probability Probability Probability Probability
Urbanization in 1940 0.360*** 0.0575 2.631*** 0.481 82.50*** 28.32 3.682*** 1.284
(0.104) (0.0939) (0.740) (0.837) (27.37) (22.22) (0.679) (0.888)
Pop. Density in 1940 -3.30e-05 -0.000343 -0.000333 -0.00171 1.237 -2.722 0.0418 -0.177
(0.000278) (0.000249) (0.00219) (0.00161) (2.252) (3.354) (0.146) (0.167)
GDP per capita in 1949 -0.0790*** -0.00712 -0.674*** -0.0787 -9.565*** 3.413 -0.534** 0.129
(0.0150) (0.0144) (0.161) (0.156) (3.657) (8.567) (0.212) (0.404)
Semiarid Indicator 0.00742 0.0938 20.63 1.292*
(0.0220) (0.232) (19.95) (0.782)
Amazon Indicator 0.395*** 2.292*** -7.137 -0.809*
(0.0530) (0.276) (7.567) (0.470)
Coastal Indicator 0.518*** 2.776*** 90.65*** 3.001***
(0.0443) (0.243) (34.54) (0.651)
Constant 0.176*** 0.0934*** -1.513*** -2.314*** -9.173 3.725 1.471*** 1.572***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.138) (0.184) (6.994) (8.538) (0.546) (0.374)
Observations 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273
R-squared 0.024 0.255 - - 0.008 0.053 - -
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions are for 1,275 Minimum Comparable Areas (MCAs). There are two dependent
variables: a dummy variable if any drilling attempt happen during 1940 to 2000 (columns (1) to (4) of the table) and the number of drilling
attempts during 1940 and 2000 (columns (5) to (9) of the table). Pre-treatment variables are: urbanization rate in 1940, population density in
1940 and per capita GDP in 1949. Geographical controls are indicator variables showing whether the MCA is located in the Semiarid region, in
the Amazon region, or on the coast.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Drilling conditional on a Field Discovery
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Wells drilled per year
Estimation: OLS Poisson
Simple Discovery Dummy 5.502** 5.255***
(2.259) (0.514)
Simple Discovery Dummy * log Population Density -0.517 -0.0689
(0.600) (0.0721)
Simple Discovery Dummy * log GDP/capita 0.849 0.107
(1.121) (0.135)
Simple Discovery Dummy * Urbanization 4.706 0.690
(5.925) (0.829)
Constant 0.0285*** -3.557***
(0.0104) (0.366)
Observations 5,098 5,098
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions are for 1,275 Minimum
Comparable Areas (MCAs). The dependent variable is the count of drills per year. The
explanatory variables are a dummy for a eld discovery and the interactions between
this dummy and GDP/capita, urbanization and population density.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Discovery Dummy: Analysis
Dependent Variable: Oil Production
(1) (2)
All Discoveries 0.681***
(0.0524)
True Discoveries 0.777***
(0.0472)
MCA FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 8,901 8,901
Number of MCAs 1,273 1,273
Geography Controls Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE
F-Statistics 9.86 20.41
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA
level. Explanatory variables are three dummies
related to oil discovery. Geographic controls and
initial conditions have time-varying coecients.
The initial conditions with time-varying coe-
cients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization
rate in 1940, and Population Density in 1940.
The geographic controls with time-varying coef-
cients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates,
Dummy for Amazon, Dummy for Coastal. The
total sample consists of 1,275 Minimum Compa-
rable Areas (MCA).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Intention-to-Treat Eect of All Oil Discoveries: Socio-Economic
Outcomes
Dry Drilling Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln Population ln GDP Urbanization ln Population ln GDP Urbanization
Density per capita Rate Density per capita Rate
Discovery Dummy -0.0390 0.125* 0.0283 -0.0400 0.146* 0.0253
(0.0579) (0.0728) (0.0187) (0.0626) (0.0783) (0.0199)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,776 1,332 1,776 1,024 768 1,024
Number of MCAs 222 222 222 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients.
The initial conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population
Density in 1940. The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for
Amazon, and Dummy for Coastal. Discovery is dened as \All Discoveries".
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Intention-to-Treat Eect of True Oil Discoveries: Socio-Economic
Outcomes
Dry Drilling Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln Population ln GDP Urbanization ln Population ln GDP Urbanization
Density per capita Rate Density per capita Rate
Discovery Dummy -0.00864 0.246*** 0.0443** -0.0127 0.259*** 0.0430**
(0.0676) (0.0856) (0.0202) (0.0731) (0.0910) (0.0213)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,776 1,332 1,776 1,024 768 1,024
Number of MCAs 222 222 222 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients.
The initial conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population
Density in 1940. The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for
Amazon, and Dummy for Coastal. Discovery is dened as \True Discovery".
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Intention-to-Treat Eect of Oil Discoveries: Robustness to
alternative control groups
Non-Oil Municipalities in Oil States Dry Drilling, No Neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln Population ln GDP Urbanization ln Population ln GDP Urbanization
Density per capita Rate Density per capita Rate
Discovery Dummy -0.0560 0.262*** 0.0519*** -0.0302 0.195** 0.0362*
(0.0610) (0.0781) (0.0190) (0.0751) (0.0906) (0.0214)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,200 4,649 6,200 1,344 1,008 1,344
Number of MCAs 775 775 775 168 168 168
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
All Neighbors Matched Neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln Population ln GDP Urbanization ln Population ln GDP Urbanization
Density per capita Rate Density per capita Rate
Discovery Dummy 0.0114 0.247*** 0.0434** 0.0341 0.277*** 0.0419**
(0.0641) (0.0819) (0.0195) (0.0645) (0.0863) (0.0206)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,760 1,320 1,760 1,024 768 1,024
Number of MCAs 220 220 220 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients.
The initial conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population
Density in 1940. The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for
Amazon, and Dummy for Coastal. Discovery is dened as \True Discovery".
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Intention-to-Treat Eect of Oil Discoveries: Robustness adding
more Geographic Controls
Dry Drilling Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln Population ln GDP Urbanization ln Population ln GDP Urbanization
Density per capita Rate Density per capita Rate
Discovery Dummy -0.00147 0.218** 0.0372* -0.0165 0.217** 0.0390*
(0.0723) (0.0885) (0.0216) (0.0808) (0.0944) (0.0231)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,776 1,332 1,776 1,024 768 1,024
Number of MCAs 222 222 222 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Additional geographic controls are: Average Temperature, Average
Rainfall, Average Altitude, Dummy for Semiarid. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients.
The initial conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population
Density in 1940. The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for
Amazon, Dummy for Coastal, Average Temperature, Average Rainfall, Average Altitude, Dummy for Semiarid. Discovery is
dened as \True Discovery".
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Intention-to-Treat Eect of Oil Discoveries: Robustness 1996 nal
year of analysis
Dry Drilling Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln Population ln GDP Urbanization ln Population ln GDP Urbanization
Density per capita Rate Density per capita Rate
Discovery Dummy -0.0291 0.200** 0.0459** -0.0242 0.225** 0.0449**
(0.0645) (0.0926) (0.0203) (0.0698) (0.0969) (0.0210)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,776 1,332 1,776 1,024 768 1,024
Number of MCAs 222 222 222 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Number of observations is smaller because the nal year in the panel is
1996 instead of 2000. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients. The initial conditions with
time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population Density in 1940. The geographic
controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for Amazon, Dummy for Coastal,
Average Temperature, Average Rainfall, Average Altitude, Dummy for Semiarid. Discovery is dened as \True Discovery".
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Intention-to-Treat Eect of Oil Discoveries: Sectoral GDP per
capita
Dry Drilling Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Manufacturing Service Agriculture Manufacturing Service Agriculture
GDP per cap GDP per cap GDP per cap GDP per cap GDP per cap GDP per cap
Discovery Dummy 0.449** 0.213** 0.0569 0.456** 0.215** 0.0664
(0.182) (0.0968) (0.107) (0.189) (0.104) (0.109)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,325 1,321 1,328 765 764 765
Number of MCAs 222 222 222 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients. The
initial conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population Density in 1940.
The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for Amazon, and Dummy for
Coastal. Discovery is dened as \True Discovery".
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14: Intention-to-Treat Eect of Oil Discoveries: Sectoral Labor
Productivity per capita
Dry Drilling Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Manufacturing Service Agriculture Manufacturing Service Agriculture
Labor Prod. Labor Prod. Labor Prod. Labor Prod. Labor Prod. Labor Prod.
Discovery Dummy 0.265* 0.221** -0.0717 0.222 0.188* -0.0535
(0.139) (0.106) (0.0881) (0.143) (0.113) (0.0871)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,533 1,542 1,547 883 891 891
Number of MCAs 222 222 222 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients. The
initial conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population Density in
1940. The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for Amazon, and
Dummy for Coastal. Discovery is dened as \True Discovery".
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Onshore versus Oshore Discoveries 1
Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES GDP Manufacturing GDP GDP Manufacturing GDP
per cap per cap per cap per cap
Onshore Discovery Dummy 0.3429*** 0.5270**
(0.1067) (0.2157)
Oshore Discovery Dummy 0.2081 0.4537*
(0.1315) (0.2303)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 768 891 768 891
Number of MCAs 128 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. The main explanatory variable is the number of injection
wells. The number of injection and production wells is instrumented with the number of discovery wells. Geo-
graphic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients. The initial conditions with time-varying
coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population Density in 1940. The geographic
controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for Amazon, Dummy
for Coastal. The control group is the matched dry drilling sample.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 16: Onshore versus Oshore Discoveries 2
Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Service Urbanization Service Urbanization
Labor Prod. Rate Labor Prod. Rate
Onshore Discovery Dummy 0.280** 0.0542**
(0.135) (0.0237)
Oshore Discovery Dummy 0.0187 0.0135
(0.126) (0.0313)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 891 1,024 891 1,024
Number of MCAs 128 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. The main explanatory variable is the number
of injection wells. The number of injection and production wells is instrumented with the number of
discovery wells. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients. The initial
conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and
Population Density in 1940. The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and
Longitude coordinates, Dummy for Amazon, Dummy for Coastal. The control group is the matched
dry drilling sample.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Local Average Treatment Eect of Oil Production
Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln Population ln GDP Urbanization Manufacturing Service Agriculture
Density per capita Rate GDP per cap GDP per cap GDP per cap
Production Dummy -0.0190 0.411*** 0.0644** 0.725** 0.343** 0.105
(0.106) (0.143) (0.0314) (0.295) (0.166) (0.166)
First Stage F-Stat. 27.38 13.74 27.38 13.33 14.48 13.89
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,024 768 1,024 765 764 765
Number of MCAs 128 128 128 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients. The
initial conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population Density in
1940. The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for Amazon, and
Dummy for Coastal. Production is instrumented with Discovery. Discovery is dened as 'True Discovery'.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 18: Treatment Intensity
Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln GDP Urbanization ln GDP Urbanization
per capita Rate per capita Rate
Number of Production Wells 0.000664** 7.55e-05**
(0.000317) (3.70e-05)
Number of Injection Wells 0.0123** 0.00146*
(0.00573) (0.000871)
First Stage F-Stat. 6.98 15.92 6.29 31.21
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 768 1,024 768 1,024
Number of MCAs 128 128 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. The main explanatory variable is the number of injection
wells. The number of injection and production wells is instrumented with the number of discovery wells.
Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients. The initial conditions with time-
varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population Density in 1940.
The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for
Amazon, Dummy for Coastal. The number of discovery wells is used an as instrument.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 19: Discoveries and Processing Production Facilities
Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Production Production
Facilities Facilities
Dummy Dummy
Discovery Dummy 0.102**
(0.0486)
Large Discovery Dummy 0.147**
(0.0709)
MCA FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 896 896
Number of MCAs 128 128
Geography Controls Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Ge-
ographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying
coecients. The initial conditions with time-varying coe-
cients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940,
and Population Density in 1940. The geographic controls
with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude
coordinates, Dummy for Amazon, Dummy for Coastal. Dis-
covery is dened as 'True Discovery'. 'Large Discovery' is a
discovery which makes the hosting municipality one of the
top 20 in terms of wells.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 20: Excluding Locations with Downstream Production
Matched Dry Drilling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln Population ln GDP Urbanization Manufacturing Service Agriculture
Density per capita Rate GDP per cap GDP per cap GDP per cap
Discovery Dummy -0.00430 0.211*** 0.0424* 0.455** 0.255** 0.0789
(0.0730) (0.0738) (0.0238) (0.194) (0.107) (0.117)
MCA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 904 678 904 676 675 674
Number of MCAs 113 113 113 113 113 113
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Notes. Standard errors clustered at the MCA level. Geographic controls and initial conditions have time-varying coecients. The
initial conditions with time-varying coecients are: GDP/capita in 1949, Urbanization rate in 1940, and Population Density in
1940. The geographic controls with time-varying coecients are: Latitude and Longitude coordinates, Dummy for Amazon, and
Dummy for Coastal. Discovery is dened as 'True Discovery'.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Appendix: On Drilling and Production
There is an extensive literature on the principles and practises of oil drilling and production
(e.g., from petroleum geology and petroleum engineering). In this appendix, we aim to
clarify selected aspects of drilling and production that are relevant to our research design,
without detailing every single aspect of oil (and gas) exploration and production.
Oil exploration and production are associated with risk. Although there are several
technical methods for appraising hydrocarbon resources, the industry always works with
limited information on the existence of hydrocarbon deposits. The uncertainty is related
to the location, volume, and quality of hydrocarbon deposits. Even with enough geological
information, there is always the risk of drilling a dry exploratory hole or not discovering
commercial quantities of oil. There are also risks during the production phase such as the
price of oil, costs and taxes, institutional uncertainty, regulation, natural disasters, and
accidents. Oshore drilling in deep water presents even greater challenges. According to
Harbaugh, Davis, and Wendebourg (1995), luck is a major factor in oil exploration. The
name for an exploratory well (called a \wildcat") talks by itself regarding the inherent risk
of oil business.
The petroleum industry is loosely divided into two segments: upstream and down-
stream. Upstream industry comprises exploration and production activities. By produc-
tion activities, the process of recovering petroleum from the subsurface is meant. Upstream
activities occur both onshore and oshore. In turn, downstream industry entails process-
ing, retailing and transporting petroleum.
Oil exploration involves several steps using a compilation of knowledge from geology,
geophysics, and geochemistry. The oil company aims to nd an oil eld - a contiguous
geographic area with oil. First, petroleum professionals collect useful geological informa-
tion on a \prospect" (a delimited area that possesses certain geological features that may
induce drilling). By \useful information", they mean a source rock, a reservoir, and a
trap42. A source rock is a rock within which oil or gas is generated from organic material
(Petroleum Extension Service (2005)). A source rock is usually a shale rock. Nevertheless,
not every shale has enough biogenic material to be classied as a source rock. The reservoir
accumulates hydrocarbons and is made from porous rocks. Rocks must have porosity to
accumulate hydrocarbons and basically only sedimentary rocks are porous enough. Typi-
cal sedimentary rocks forming a reservoir include sandstone and limestone. The \quality"
of the oil inside the reservoir can vary depending on its properties and impurities (e.g., the
presence of sulfur and metals). The company also looks for areas with specic geological
features called traps. The hydrocarbon trap is composed of two elements: a structure
(subsurface contortion) and a seal. Hydrocarbon molecules are lighter than water, and
there are subsurface contortions that induce the hydrocarbons moving upward towards the
surface (e.g., anticlines and faults). Therefore, there is a need of a \seal" to prevent the
hydrocarbons from spilling out on the surface. A seal is another rock with low perme-
ability (as porosity to accumulate hydrocarbons in the reservoir is important, the degree
of connections between pore spaces of the rock formation is relevant to have a seal rock).
Shale rock is typically a good seal to avoid the spilling because it has low permeability.
42There are three type of rocks according to how they are formed: ignite (from magma), sedimentary
(from erosion) and metamorphic (a heated sedimentary or a heated ignite rock). Sedimentary rocks are
more interesting because petroleum accumulation chiey occur in them. An example of a sedimentary
rock is the shale rock, originated by clay compacted by subsurface pressure and weight. Other examples
of sedimentary rocks include sandstone (from sand) and limestone (from shells).
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Shale rock has porosity too, but it has very low permeability (thus it is a good seal).
In sum, the area should contain selected characteristics, such as abundant sandstone
reservoir rocks, shale for hydrocarbon source rock and numerous geological structures for
potential trapping of hydrocarbons. Each oil eld has a \ngerprint" and its unique
characteristics lead to a case-by-case analysis of drilling attempts. Wells are very expensive
to drill, so previous studies must be as accurate and precise as possible.
After inferring the subsurface and if there are strong indications of potentially oil-
bearing formations, the oil company may drill an exploratory well. Even with all positive
indications of oil presence, only by making a hole can the company be sure of the pres-
ence (or absence) of oil. During the drilling process, data acquisition is key. There are
several logging (recording information) procedures during the drilling phase so as to, for
example, dierentiate permeable and impermeable rock formations (called \`logging-while-
drilling").43 Depending on the outcome of the exploratory drilling, the company evaluates
the well's hydrocarbon potential. Not even an evidence of hydrocarbon deposit as told by
logs is a guarantee that producing oil is really possible. One can assign a priori probabilities
before drilling, and revise the probability of success given the proven result of the drilling
attempt. Updated probabilities can be used as a source of experience to be transferred
to future drilling attempts. Depending on the preliminary information received during
drilling, the well can be abandoned or not. In the end, using all information available the
company decides whether the drilling had generated a discovery or a dry hole.
After a discovery, the appraisal continues: additional drilling is required to delineate the
size and extension of the oil eld44. \Step-out" wells (delineation or appraising wells) are
the wells used to evaluate the extent of the eld. The more is known about the oil eld, the
easier and less expensive to drill additional wells. Generally, the number of step-out wells
is positively correlated with the magnitude of the eld that was discovered. Once the oil
company has delineated the oil eld and is secure on the viability of production, it starts to
(i) complete the existing wells and (ii) to drill additional production wells (producer wells).
To complete a well means to perform the necessary operations to bring uids to the surface
(Petroleum Extension Service (1997)). After completion and the drilling of producer wells,
oil and gas production cycle begins. Production cycle occurs after exploration has proven
successful. An economic assessment of the production cycle should entail reserve and risk
calculations (Hyne (2001)).
The production cycle involves a natural phase and enhanced phase. Initially, natural
pressure from the reservoir brings oil from the reservoir to the surface. As production
proceeds, the reservoir pressure goes down. However, pressure is important because it
drives oil and gas out of the reservoir. Normally, after some time producing from an oil
well, pressure decreases and the oil company needs to (articially) add pressure to the well.
The addition of articial pressure to optimize production is broadly called \enhanced oil
recovery" and is divided into primary, secondary, and tertiary recovery. Primary recovery
(or primary production) means to use an articial method of lifting. The most common
articial lift system is a beam pump to pump up the oil. During primary recovery, only
a small percentage of the hydrocarbon deposits are produced. Secondary recovery aims
at restoring the reservoir pressure by injecting water (waterooding) or gas. Secondary
recovery is costly because it deals with huge amounts of water and gas. To supplement
falling pressure due to production, new wells are drilled (injection wells) to inject water
43One example is the logging from the drilling uid.
44\Play" is the name used to describe the extent of a hydrocarbon-bearing formation.
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and gas usually at the edges of the oil eld. This injection aims to either slow production
decline or to increase production. Finally, tertiary recovery happens when there is injection
of steam or special chemicals (chemical ooding) into the reservoir. In practise, all three
recovery phases can occur concomitantly45.
Enhanced recovery is so important in the petroleum industry that the location of the
producer well is chosen with the secondary well (injection well) in mind. As mentioned
before, eorts to enhance recovery are costly and are dependent upon the state of the econ-
omy and potential oil recovery volume. Consequently, repeated monitoring of a reservoir is
essential to locate injection wells. The idea is to design an optimal distribution of injection
wells to optimize long-term production.
There are several types of wells: wildcat well, rank wildcat well, step-out well, producer
well, injection well, etc. Since there are dierent steps to obtain oil, wells are classied
broadly as exploratory wells and development wells. Examples of exploratory wells are
wildcat wells (drilled a mile or more from an area of existing oil production) and rank
wildcat wells (drilled in an area where there is no existing production). If the exploratory
drilling is proven successful, the company starts to drill step-out wells (also included in
the exploratory well category). After the oil eld has been delineated, the company starts
to drill production wells in the known extent of the eld. Every well drilled inside the
known extent of the eld is called development wells (Hyne (2001)). The development
well category includes producer wells and injection wells (recall that injection wells are to
enhance oil recovery). Dierent categories of wells have dierent probabilities of nding oil.
A rank wildcat exploratory well have on average lower success ratio than a step-out well.
An oil company can rank wells in terms of probability even working under uncertainty.
The American Petroleum Institute reported that in 2000 the success rate for wildcat well
was 39% (Hyne (2001)). Note that an unsuccessful drilling is classied as a dry hole in
both exploratory and development well categories.
The evolution of knowledge to identify potentially oil-bearing formations also helps
to understand the oil industry. This evolution comprises both advances of the theory on
petroleum-bearing formations and ever-improving technology. In the very beginning of oil
exploration, conspicuous targets were searched in order to extract oil without any geology
theory (e.g., surface pools in the form of natural oil seeps) or using geology knowledge (e.g.,
anticlines and salt domes). Surface investigation (topography) of the region could point
out conspicuous areas of oil-bering formations. In 1920's and 1930's, aerial photographic
expanded the possibilities for mapping areas suitable for drilling. In the mid 1900's, seismic
technology improved subsurface mapping to locate potential petroleum-bearing formations.
By and large, seismic activities produce sound waves that aim at interpreting subsurface
formations, i.e., sound waves are generated and recorded by receivers to infer rock forma-
tions. The idea is to map the subsurface rock layers by using sound waves as dierent
rock layers have dierent acoustical properties. The recorded sounds are processed and
assembled to be interpreted. Existing seismic and well information highlights the potential
for exploration of large hydrocarbon resources. Computerization of seismic data provided
a leap to the extraction industry: high amount of data could be processed at high speed
and precision. Another big revolution was the 3D visualization that made possible a more
reliable selection of the best targets to the drilled. Moreover, 4D visualization (repeated
3D through time) helped the planning of well life-time operation. More recently, in the
last decade the discussion on automated drilling (the evolution of automation in drilling)
45There are other forms of well stimulation such as hydraulic fracturing.
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is an ongoing topic. Modern technology helps the decisions regarding the best drill sites.
Computers and satellite images improved the assessment of deposits. Nevertheless, ulti-
mately it is only by drilling that a company can be certain that hydrocarbon deposits
really exist. In other words, even investing substantially in using modern technology, it is
only by drilling that the existence of oil can be conrmed.
Up to this point, we described some general aspects of the upstream industry. Down-
stream industry includes the rening industry, petrochemicals plant, and distribution fa-
cilities (e.g., ports and terminals). Crude oil and natural gas are of little use in their raw
state (Petroleum Extension Service (1997)). Rening and processing to select groups of
components (called \fractions") is what creates value. Rening means applying chemi-
cal processes to convert fractions into commercial products. Oil and gas vary in their
hydrocarbon compounds and impurities (such as sulfur and metals). For instance, there
are light crude oils as well as heavy and thick crude oils. The complexity of the com-
position of petroleum fractions leads to more than 2,000 individual renery products
(Fahim, Al-Sahhaf, and Elkilani (2009)). Examples of rening products include gasoline,
jet fuel, kerosene, diesel fuel, and feedstocks for the petrochemical industry.
C Appendix: Royalties and Oil in Brazil
The distribution of Royalties started in 1953. Federal Law n. 2,004/53 stipulated that
5% of the revenue from onshore oil production should be distributed to states (80%) and
municipalities (20%) in the form of Royalties. Oshore oil royalties paid to states and
municipalities were introduced by 1986. In 1997, Federal Law n. 9,496/97 changed the
formula to distribute Royalties (e.g., the international price of oil started to be used in
the distribution formula). This led to a huge increase in royalty payments as illustrated
below in Figure 10, transforming it from a minor to a very signicant source of income for
municipalities.
Fig. 10: Distribution of Royalties: 1994-2000
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Notes. In 1997, Federal Law n. 9,496/97 changed the rules for distributing royalties.
The rules following the 1997 law require that an oil company must allocate between 5%
and 10% of the value of the gross output in the form of royalties. Royalties are then divided
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among the three administrative levels in Brazil (National, States, and Municipalities).
Municipalities are eligible to receive royalties based on (i) geography (if the production
takes place in their territory or, in the case of oshore production, if it is a \facing"
municipality, i.e., there is an oileld that lies inside the municipality's maritime border), (ii)
oil-related infrastructure (if within their borders there is storage, transportation, or landing
of oil and gas), and (iii) an equalization rule (there is a \special fund" that allocates part
of the royalties' revenue to all Brazilian municipalities). For some municipalities, royalties
represent a signicant part of their total revenue (more than half of total revenue in extreme
cases). According to ANP (Brazil's oil and gas industry regulator), over R$ 4.5 billions
(circa US$ 2.2 billion) in oil windfalls were distributed to the Brazilian municipalities in
2010, which represented on average 2.5% of the total revenue of municipalities receiving
oil windfalls.
For a much more detailed description of the history and technicalities of royalty pay-
ments in Brazil see Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Monteiro and Ferraz (2012).
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